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Abstract—Vehicular Ad hoc Networks is one of the most 
challenging research area in the field of Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks, in this research We propose a flexible, simple, 
and scalable design for VANET certificates, and new 
methods for efficient certificate management , which will 
Reduce channel overhead by eliminating the use of CRL, 
and make Better certificate Revocation Management. 
Also it will increase the security of the network and helps 
in identifying the adversary vehicle. 
Keywords-Certificate Revocation; CRL; Adversary List; 
VANET Security; Warning Distribution; Certificate 
Management.  
I. INTRODUCTION
VANET security has gained the most research efforts in 
the past years; Certificate plays an important role in 
network communication, any node in the network can’t 
participate in the network without appropriate 
certificate. 
Dealing with certificate management raises many other 
issues like certificate revocation list (CRL) that causes 
network overhead, a CRL is a list containing the serial 
numbers of all certificates issued by a given certification 
authority (CA) that have been revoked and have not yet 
expired. CRL makes overhead and expensive to use 
especially in high mobile network. 
In this paper we concerned with certificate security and 
operations, how to protect system from adversary 
vehicles, how to distribute information about adversary 
vehicles, how to revoke certificates from adversary and 
assign new certificate for it, how to make secure 
connection, in sec. 2 we analyze the current research 
efforts in area of VANET certificates, in sec. 3 we are 
addressing our proposed network that contains solutions 
for current system. 
II. ANALYSIS OF RELEVANT RESEARCH AREA: 
CRL is the most and common solution for certificate 
revocation and management, many papers tried to adapt 
the CRL solutions. 
Efforts made by [1] aiming to reduce the CRL by using 
regional CA and using short lived certificates for 
traveling vehicles, the result obtained by the author “ the 
distribution of CRL requires tens of minutes”, which is 
too long time for a high and dense network like 
VANET, the authors in [2] proposed an idea to easy 
disseminate the CRL, by deploying C2C communication 
for distributing CRL, this will make faster distribution, 
but still CRL has a huge size and require time and 
processing complexity to search in, another work [3] , 
made many experiments on the size of CRL and how to 
distribute the CRL in the VANET network, the result 
says, when the size of CRL is high the delay time for 
receiving it will be high, another idea proposed in [4] 
says that CRL will store entries for less than a year old, 
this idea used to decrease the size of CRL, but still 
suffer from huge size, while Authors in [6] suggested a 
way to increase the search in CRL by using Bloom 
filter. 
The authors in [10] proposed the use of Bloom filter to 
store the revoked certificate, and dedicate the CRL just 
to sign the revocation key for each vehicle, the use for 
Bloom filter will increase the speed for searching in it, 
but still the idea is to use the CRL, the problem of 
bloom filter as it is probabilistic function, and may give 
wrong information, as the certificate may not be in the 
list, and the result that the certificate is in the list.  
The previous work and efforts didn’t eliminate the 
Problems of CRL like Huge size, no central database for 
it, Channel overhead, communication overhead, 
processing overhead. 
Authors in [5] introduce the use of temporary 
certificates and credentials for each geographic area so 
any new vehicle will not find any difficulty for 
communicating with current network, but this solution 
requires a dedicated work from CA to create and revoke 
certificate for each new coming and leaving vehicle. 
Raya et al. [6] proposed a design of three novel 
protocols for revocation, RC2RL (Revocation using 
compressed Certificate Revocation Lists), RTPD 
(Revocation of the TPD), DRP (Distributed Revocation 
Protocol)  the first one tried to compress the CRL to 
solve the size of CRL, the second protocol tries to solve 
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the revocation problem  when the CA in presence, and 
the third when CA is not found, these protocols added 
more complexity to network and didn’t deal with all
cases of certificate management, while authors in [9] 
made analysis on the protocols of [6] and proposed new 
and more efficient revocation protocol called DRTA 
aims to use short lived certificates issued by CA. 
Authors in [7] suggested a simple way for revocation, 
but it makes the channel vulnerable against attacks like 
Sybil attack, and causes a channel overhead. 
The authors in [2] proposed the employment of vehicles 
to distribute CRL, when Road Side Unit (RSU) is not 
exist, this will reduce the communication bandwidth 
usage, but still has a problem as the relay from vehicle 
to vehicle raises security concerns. 
Authors in [8] proposed two ways for revocation, but all 
of them are the responsibility of the vehicle itself, this 
giving the adversary an opportunity for avoiding the 
revocation, it is also mentioned that each vehicle must 
have a notion of trust. 
III. PROPOSED NETWORK
A. The basic Idea: 
• Certificates: 
In normal network system, each vehicle must have a 
certificate for transmission, and this allows each vehicle 
to transmit even if it considered as adversary, thus it is a 
problem needs to be solved, many papers introduced 
ideas to solve it [1], [2], [3] and [6], and the most 
common idea is the use of Certificate Revocation List 
(CRL), CRL will keep the ability for the vehicle to 
transmit, if any vehicle receives information from a 
revoked vehicle it will accept the information and apply 
the id of the sender to the CRL, if the id in the list the 
receiver will ignore the message, otherwise it will take 
it, this procedure causes network overhead for frequent 
retransmission of CRL and causes high computation 
overhead for each vehicle when receiving any 
information, and again allows the adversary vehicle to 
transmit, in some situations the receiving vehicle may 
accept the information received from adversary, as not 
all vehicles have the updated CRL. 
Our new idea is to provide each vehicle with special 
certificate; this certificate will insure the intention status 
of the vehicle, a Valid Certificate (VC) will be given to 
the valid vehicle (I mean: not adversary), and Adversary 
Certificate (AC) for adversary vehicle. 
Each certificate will require 100 byte from memory, and 
the design of VC as in figure 1.  
And the design of AC as in figure 2. 
The use of this kind of certificates will eliminate the need for 
CRL. 
The life time for AC will be one year, and to be checked 
by the traffic authority when making yearly checkup, as 
the problem maybe from the hardware. 
The reason of revocation will follow this code: 
Each vehicle has its own electronic document this 
document called certificate, this certificate has a limited 
and short life, authors in [10] suggested the use of each 
certificate for 10 minutes after that the certificate will 
expire, the use of these certificates is to insure the 
identity of the sender, VC certificate will insure the 
intention of the sender,  both certificates will be 
attached along with every message, when a vehicle 
transmit a message, first it encrypts the message and the 
certificates and attach them together and send them, 
when a receiver receives a message, simply it will 
decrypt the certificate, if the certificate is VC, the 
receiver will decrypt the message and accept it, if the 
certificate is AC, the receiver will ignore the message, 
and makes a warning message for all the neighboring 
vehicles about that adversary vehicle, see figure 5. 
The warning includes  
Fig. 1: Valid Certificate 
Fig. 2:  Adversary Certificate 
Table 1: Table of Reason of Revocation. 
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The “Adversary id” is the id of the adversary, “warning 
issuer id” used to know who made the warning, “time 
stamp” to insure the freshness of the warning, “reason of 
revocation” the code used to know why the certificate 
been revoked and “AC review Date” to know when this 
AC will expire and need to be reviewed. 
The warning will be stored in a small list called 
Adversary List (AL), this list contains 10 entries, and 
each entry represents an adversary vehicle. 
  
The importance of this list is that it is internal list, so no 
need to retransmit it periodically like CRL, the size of it 
is small, and of course smaller than the CRL is, it is 
fully updated as it contains information about current 
network and information about neighboring vehicles, as 
not all vehicles need revocation information about the 
whole network, if a vehicle wants to know information 
about the revocation information for the whole network, 
it simply makes request from nearest RSU available 
asking for CRL. 
This list is ordered as new entry will be added at the top, 
and other nodes in the list will be stepped down, the 
tenth element will be removed first, the size of AL has a 
tradeoff, as if it is bigger, it will contain more adversary 
id’s but the search in it will be slower, we have used 10 
elements only as it contains the adversaries from current 
road, not all the world of VANET. 
The conditions for removing an entry from the list are 
when new entry arrives, the tenth element will be 
removed, or when the vehicle leaves the street. 
To take advantage from the list, we propose a new idea 
for receiving procedure, after the sender sends the 
encrypted message with the encrypted certificate, the 
receiver will take the id of the receiver and apply it to 
AL, if the id of the sender exists in AL, this means that
the of the sender is not in the AL then the receiver will 
decrypt the certificate, if the certificate is AC the sender 
must be considered as new adversary, so the receiver 
will make sender is an adversary, so the receiver will 
ignore the message and it will move the id of the sender 
to the top of AL, if the id three steps, first it will add the 
senders id to AL, second step, make a warning message 
to the neighbors about this adversary, and third step, 
ignoring the message, if the certificate is VC then the 
receiver will take the message. 
We made the search in the list first as it is faster than the 
decryption, and this method is more efficient and faster 
than searching in CRL. 
• Revocation:  
Certificate revocation is used as a solution to degrade 
the adversary abilities from harming the system, the 
proposed protocols by [6] adds some complexity to the 
network, however, making an efficient and robust 
revocation is a hot research topic, in this paper we 
propose new protocol for revocation called Valid 
Adversary Protocol (VAP). 
- How it Works 
Fig. 3: AC Warning 
     Fig. 5: AC Warning Distribution.
   Fig. 6: Receiving New Message
Fig. 4: Adversary List. 
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Before we start to talk about the protocol procedure we 
would like to introduce an idea for making category for 
every transmission, so any transmission of a message 
will be classified into a specific category, this will make 
it easy to the vehicle to track and analyze the received 
messages.  
  
- VBP Steps 
1) Step 1- suspicion: any vehicle suspect an 
action from  a certain vehicle, the way that the 
vehicle sense the suspicion is out of the scope 
of the paper and will be considered as future 
work, but we can consider a case, as an 
example, where a vehicle receives information 
from  9 vehicles, all of  them has VC and 
sending message with the same category and 
information, except of one of them sending a 
contradictory information, this vehicle could be 
a suspect, if this vehicle kept sending a 
contradictory information more than once, an 
accusation message will be sent to RSU. 
2) Step 2- Accusation: Local RSU begin to 
receive many accusations about certain vehicle, 
the accusation (Ac) must be encrypted with the 
public key (PK) of RSU, RSU decrypt the 
accusation messages and make sure about VC 
of each sender, if number of accusers (AcV) is 
more than threshold, let us say the half number 
of current vehicles on the road, then RSU will 
consider the accused vehicle (AV) as an 
adversary, and it will send an accusation to 
CA. 
From AcV  
       Accusation = AcKp {RR, VC, Sig, TS, AV} (1) 
TS: Time stamp, Sig: Signature of the accuser, RR: 
Reason of Revocation, VC: Valid Certificate of the 
accuser, Kp: public Key of RSU. 
3) Step 3- RSU will send the accusation message 
to CA, and CA will consider the accused 
vehicle as an adversary. 
From RSU  
           Accusation = AcKp {RR, Sig, TS, AV} (2) 
 Sig: is the signature of RSU, Kp: public key of CA. 
4) Step 4- CA sends an order to RSU, to erase the 
certificate of the adversary vehicle, and sends 
new AC for the adversary vehicle. 
From CA  
         Erase= ErKp {RR, Sig, TS, AV, AC} (3) 
Sig: is the signature of CA, Kp: public key of RSU. 
5) Step 5- RSU makes a erase order to kill all the 
keys of the adversary vehicle, and insert AC 
for it, containing all information required for it, 
after inserting this certificate in the adversary 
vehicle, it can’t communicate without this 
certificate, this makes it easy to identify the 
adversary, after that RSU broadcasts a warning 
message to all vehicles on the road to add the 
id of the new adversary at the top of their AL. 
From RSU  
          Erase = ErKp {RR, Sig, TS, AV} (4) 
From RSU  
 Insert=insKp {AC, TS, Sig} (5) 
Sig: is the signature of RSU, Kp: public key of AV. 
From RSU  
 Add = addKp {AV, TS, Sig, RR, RD} (6) 
RD: AC Review Date, Kp: Public key for any 
received vehicle, as this message will be sent to all 
vehicles on the road. 
6) CA adds the id of the new adversary into the 
CRL. 
Add = add {AV, TS, RR} (7) 
When RSU intended to make the revocation, some rules 
must be considered:  
Fig. 7: VBP Steps. 
Code Priority Application 
001 Safety of Life Intersection Collision Warning 
/Avoidance 
002 Safety of Life Cooperative Collision Warning 
003 Safety  Work Zone Warning 
004 Safety  Transit Vehicle Signal Priority 
005 Non-Safety  Toll Collection 
006 Non-Safety  Service Announcement 
007 Non-Safety  Movie Download( 2 hours of MPEG 1) 
Table 2: Message Category. 
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1) Each accuser must attach a “Valid Certificate” 
with its accusation message; any accusations 
with “Adversary Certificate” will be ignored. 
2) The accusation must contain the accuser 
signature and must be encrypted with public 
key of RSU. 
3) RSU will consider the accusations if number of 
accusers are more than threshold related to the 
total number of the vehicles on the road. 
After making the revocation the adversary vehicle will 
have just one certificate, this certificate tells other 
vehicles that this vehicle is a trouble maker so “avoid 
it”. 
This protocol (VAP) is an optimization of RTPD 
protocol for revocation, as in RTPD, after erasing all the 
vehicle certificates, the adversary vehicle can simply 
contact with any CA, and make request for initiating 
new certificate, or steal any expired certificate and 
request for renew, in VAP after erasing all the adversary 
certificate, AC will be assigned to the adversary so any 
communication must be through that certificate. 
When any vehicle transmits, it includes VC or AC 
certificate with identity certificate, the receiver will 
make sure that VC and identity certificate belongs to 
one sender, identity certificate expires after small period 
of time, this will prevent the adversary from stealing VC 
from other vehicles, as it will be difficult to frequently 
steal more than one certificates from one vehicle or 
different vehicles due to mobility and other security 
considerations.   
III. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Bad behavior expected to happen frequently in VANET 
due to the large number of audience, Certificate 
management process is a critical issue that must be 
considered to protect the network from possible attacks. 
In this paper we introduced new methods for dealing 
and managing the certificates, these methods will make 
the network less overhead, and the communication 
faster, and provides an easier way to recognize the 
adversary vehicles, in our future work we would like to 
make simulation for previous protocol and methods. 
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